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Stolt-Nielsen and Its Implications
Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
Although it failed to gamer the publicity that a decision of its magnitude de-
serves, the Court's holding in Stolt-Nielsen has profound implications for nearly
every potential reader of this case note. More than merely upsetting professional
arbitrators, the decision threatens to disturb much of the legal profession, and its
consequences could harm the interests of all consumers who enter into contractual
relationships with corporations subject to jurisdiction in the United States. The
Court managed all of this through its application of the standard of review articu-
lated in the decision, which authorizes a judge to vacate an arbitral award if she
thinks that an arbitral panel has "dispensed its own brand of industrial justice."I
This expansive standard permits unwarranted judicial encroachment over the legi-
timate province of arbitral panels. Undermining the legitimacy and authority of
arbitral panels to such an extent potentially imperils the future of arbitration as a
viable forum for resolving disputes. Diminishing the legitimacy of arbitration in
this way will likely significantly increase the caseload of congested trial courts, as
well as increase costs associated with settling disputes.
The immediate effect of the holding was to allow a group of corporate defen-
dants to use their superior bargaining position in the contracting process to effec-
tively shield themselves from liability. 2 Although Stolt-Nielsen involved business
entities, the case also has implications in the consumer context. If the Court were
to extend the reasoning of the case to disputes involving adhesion contracts, cor-
porations would enjoy this immunity in the context of consumer disputes. Far
from a hypothetical exercise in the reaches of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the
Court is expected to decide this very issue during the 2010 term.3 In light of these
concerns, Congress should enact the Arbitration Fairness Act in order to prevent
further injustice.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
Defendant Stolt-Nielsen is an ocean carrier that charters compartments aboard
shipping vessels to companies such as Plaintiff AnimalFeeds for the purpose of
1. 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1762 (2010).
2. Id. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
3. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 45 (U.S. 2010) (the Court is
scheduled to rule on whether provisions of the FAA preempt state law protections that prohibit corpo-
rations from contracting out of class action arbitration in consumer contracts).
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transporting products around the world.4 Plaintiff AnimalFeeds brought a claim
against Defendant Stolt-Nielsen and other companies alleging price fixing.s The
Department of Justice conclusively proved that the defendants engaged in price
fixing.6 AnimalFeeds suit was consolidated with actions brought by similar char-
tering companies also alleging price fixing.7
As a result of a Second Circuit ruling that the dispute between Defendant
Stolt-Nielsen and one of the plaintiff companies was subject to arbitration, the
parties to the proposed antitrust class action all agreed to settle the dispute in arbi-
tration.8 The parties further decided to submit to an arbitration panel the question
of whether the contracts the parties signed allowed for class arbitration.9 In pre-
senting this question to the arbitration panel, the parties stipulated that the arbitra-
tion clauses were silent on the issue of whether the relevant contracts permitted
class arbitration.' 0 The arbitration panel settled this issue by holding that the re-
spective contracts allowed for class arbitration."
However, the district court subsequently vacated the judgment of the panel,
holding that the arbitral panel had ruled in "manifest disregard of the law."A The
court based its holding on the panel's failure to consider relevant law in issuing
the award.'3 New York state and federal maritime law, which provided the rele-
vant legal context, required judicial bodies to interpret contracts in light of custom
and usage, neither of which ever recognized the validity of class action arbitra-
tion.1
The Second Circuit reversed the district court, reasoning that the panel had
not manifestly disregarded the law because the defendants had not cited any ex-
ample of an authority applying maritime law to prohibit class action arbitration.' 5
The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether an arbitral panel
violates provisions of the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) when it permits class
action arbitration in the context of a dispute governed by an arbitration clause that
is silent on the issue.' 6
The Court reversed the ruling of the Second Circuit, holding that "imposing
class arbitration on parties who have not agreed to authorize class arbitration is
inconsistent with the FAA." 7 In reaching this conclusion, the Court asserted that
4. 130 S. Ct. at 1764.
5. Id. at 1764-65.
6. Id. at 1765 (mentioning anti-competitive business practices is relevant because such coercive
tactics undermine the Supreme Court and the FAA's overriding concern with mutual consent while
negotiating an arbitration agreement. Establishing that the defendants engaged in price fixing is an
example of collusive market manipulation during the negotiation process in question, which arguably
challenges the Court's insistence that the failure to include a class action stipulation in the contract
clearly indicates that the parties involved assented to only bilateral arbitration).
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 1765.
10. Stoll-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1760.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1766.
14. Id.
15. Id. at 1766-67.
16. Stoll-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764.
17. Id. at 1765.
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the panel had "dispensed its own brand of industrial justice" by basing its decision
on the public policy arguments advanced by AnimalFeeds.' 8
III. LEGAL HISTORY
A. Standard of Review
In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) in an attempt to
further the three primary goals of arbitration: namely, efficiency, cost-
effectiveness, and finality.'9 Regarding the goal of finality, the act specified only
four circumstances in which a district court could vacate an award.2  These four
situations, which are outlined in Section 10 of the FAA, are as follows:
(1) where the award was cured by option, fraud, or undue means;
(2) where there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators or
either of them;
(3) where the arbitrators were guilty of misconduct in refusing to post-
pone the hearing, upon sufficient cause shown, or in refusing to hear evi-
dence pertinent and material to the controversy; or of any other misbeha-
vior by which the rights of any party have been prejudiced; or
(4) where the arbitrators exceeded their powers, or so imperfectly ex-
ecuted them that mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made.2 '
In 1953, the Supreme Court provided for additional grounds by which a judge
could vacate an arbitral award. In Wilko v. Swan, the Court established that
judges have the authority to overturn an arbitral decision made in "manifest disre-
gard of the law."2 Following this decision, nearly every U.S. federal circuit
adopted some form of this seemingly judicially created standard for reviewing
arbitral awards.23 Although the precise wording of the doctrine varies among
18. Id. at 1775.
19. Lindon Fry, Letting the Fox Guard the Henhouse: Why the Fifth Circuit's Ruling in Positive
Software Solutions Sacrifices Procedural Fairness for Speed and Convenience, 58 CATH. U. L. REV.
599,601(2009).
20. Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1925) (current version of FAA at 9 U.S.C. §§ I -
16(2006)).
21. Id
22. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
23. Halim v. Great Gatsby's Auction Gallery, Inc., 516 F.3d 557, 563 (7th Cir. 2008); Collins v.
D.R. Horton, Inc., 505 F.3d 874, 879 (9th Cir. 2007); Three S Del. Inc. v. DataQuick Info. Sys., Inc.,
492 F.3d 520, 527 (4th Cir. 2007); McCarthy v. Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc., 463 F.3d 87, 91 (1st Cir.
2006); Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. v. Echostar Satellite LLC, 430 F.3d 1269, 1275 (10th Cir. 2005);
Manion v. Nagin, 392 F.3d 294, 298 (8th Cir. 2004); Dluhos v. Strasberg, 321 F.3d 365, 370 (3rd Cir.
2003); Hoeft v. MVL Group, Inc., 343 F.3d 57, 64 (2nd Cir. 2003); Prestige Ford v. Ford Dealer
Computer Scrys., Inc., 324 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2003); Scott v. Prudential Sec., Inc., 141 F.3d 1007,
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jurisdictions, the basic test involves a determination of whether an arbitrator was
aware of the governing law but decided not to apply it.24
Throughout the second half of the 20th century, courts continued to build
upon the foundation created by Wilko. This evolution included the development
of standards granting considerable discretion to contracting parties to establish the
grounds upon which a court could vacate an arbitral award.25 In Hall Street Asso-
ciates, LLC v. Mattel, Inc., however, the U.S. Supreme Court seemed to halt this
expansion of the grounds for such review. 26
In Hall Street, the Court held that parties are not permitted to expand the
standard for vacating an arbitral award through express contractual provisions.27
In doing so, the Court rejected Hall Street's argument that Wilko had provided for
considerable expansion of these grounds beyond the confines of Section 10 of the
FAA.28 Specifically, the Court reasoned that the dicta of Wilko introducing the
manifest disregard of the law standard might have "merely referred to [Section 10]
grounds collectively rather than adding to them."29  Under this interpretation,
manifest disregard of the law is nothing more than shorthand for Section
10(a)(4).30 Regardless of whether manifest disregard simply restates Section 10,
Hall Street appeared to curtail the expansion of the standard for vacating arbitral
awards.31
The rejection of Hall Street's argument created considerable confusion as to
whether manifest disregard of the law continued to provide a legitimate basis for
vacating arbitral awards.32 As a result of this ambiguity, lower courts developed
their own interpretations of Hall Street's implications for the manifest disregard of
the law standard. In Citigroup Global Markets, Inc. v. Bacon, the Fifth Circuit
held that Hall Street had invalidated manifest disregard of the law as an indepen-
dent basis for review.34 Rather, a narrow reading of Section 10 of the FAA pro-
vided the only grounds on which a court could vacate an award.35 The Ninth Cir-
cuit, however, held that manifest disregard, as shorthand for Section 10(a)(4) of
the FAA, remained a viable standard for vacating arbitral awards.36 Similarly, the
Second Circuit in Stolt-Nielsen ruled that the manifest disregard of the law sur-
vived Hall Street, though it recognized the debate over whether the standard mere-
ly restates Section 10 or is a judicially created independent ground.37
24. Christopher R. Drahozal, Codifying Manifest Disregard, 8 NEv. L.J. 234, 235 (2007) (citing
Cytcy Corp. v. Deka Prods. Ltd., 439 F.3d 27, 35 (1st Cir. 2006)).
25. Maureen A. Weston, The Other Avenues of Hall Street and Prospects for Judicial Review of
ArbitralAwards, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REv. 929 (2010).
26. Hall St. Assocs., LLC v. Mattel, Inc., 552 U.S. 576, 581 (2008).
27. Id. at 592-93.
28. Id. at 584-85,
29. Idat 585.
30. Id.
31. Weston, supra note 25, at 936.
32. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeods Int'l Corp., 548 F.3d 85, 94 (2nd Cir. 2008) vacating, Stolt-
Nielsen S.A. v.AnimalFeeds Int'l Corp 130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010).
33. See, e.g., Citigroup Global Mkts., Inc. v. Bacon, 562 F.3d 349, 358 (5th Cir. 2009).
34. Id. at 358.
35. Id.
36. Comedy Club, Inc. v. Improv W. Assocs., 553 F.3d 1277, 1290 (9th Cir. 2009).
37. Stolt-Nielsen, 548 F.3d at 94 vacated, Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1758.
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B. Class Certification Absent Express Provision
The Court found certain guidelines established by the FAA dispositive to the
issue in Stolt-Nielsen." One such controlling provision requires obtaining the
consent of the parties involved in the dispute to be bound by the arbitral proceed-
ings.39 A court is to glean this mutual assent from established industry norms,
relevant legal precedent, and from the language of the controlling contract.
New York state law and the industrial norms of maritime law provided the
relevant context in Stolt-Nielsen.41 Counsel for Stolt-Nielsen submitted evidence
during the arbitral hearing that relevant maritime customs at the time the parties
contracted did not recognize the practice of arbitrating claims on a class basis. In
support of this, an expert witness testifying on behalf of Stolt-Nielsen asserted that
he had "never encountered an arbitration clause in a charter party that could be
construed as allowing class action arbitration" over the course of his 30-year ca-
reer in the maritime industry.42
Regarding case law that provides relevant context for class action arbitration
issues, Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle4 3 was the first case to reach the U.S.
Supreme Court involving the appropriateness of class-action arbitration when the
relevant contract is silent on the matter." Prior to Bazzle, it appears that most
states prohibited class certification in arbitration when the contract was silent on
the matter.45 The Court in Bazzle remanded a decision of the South Carolina Su-
preme Court back to an arbitral panel in order to decide whether the contract in
question explicitly prohibited class certification or whether the contract was silent
on the issue." If the contract were silent on the matter, the ruling allowing class
certification would prevail.47 Following Bazzle, a consensus emerged favoring
class action arbitration.48 As a result of Bazzle, one could infer, as did counsel for
AnimalFeeds, that the Court might approve of allowing class-action arbitration
when the contract is silent on the matter.49
The Court's apparent willingness to allow for class certification in the context
of arbitration seemingly caused some confusion.50 However, as the Court clarified
in Stolt-Nielsen, Bazzle does not stand for the proposition that arbitral panels are
free to interpret contracts that are silent on the issue of class-action arbitration as
38. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1773.
39. Id. at 1773-74.
40. Id. at 1769 n.6.
41. Id. at 1768.
42. Id. at 1769 n.6.
43. 539 U.S. 444 (2003).
44. Meredith W. Nissen, Class Action Arbitrations: AAA vs. JAMS. Different Approaches to a New
Concept, II DiSP. RESOL. MAG. 19, 19 (2005).
45. See, e.g., Glencore, Ltd. v. Schnitzer Steel Prods., 189 F.3d 264, 265 (2d Cir. 1999); Champ v.
Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269, 271 (7th Cir. 1995); U.K. v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d 68, 69 (2d Cir.
1993); see also William H. Baker, Class Action Arbitration, 10 CARDOZO J. CONFLicT RESOL. 335,
348 (citing an arbitration case in which "the silent clause under consideration did not permit a class
action arbitration").§
46. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 447.
47. Id.
48. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1767.
49. Id. at 1765-66.
50. Id. at 1772.
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allowing for such a proceeding.5' Rather, the majority in Bazzle did not gamer
enough support to establish this precedent.52 Although he concurred with the
majority's ruling in the particular case, Justice Stevens, the swing vote in the deci-
sion, refrained from deciding the issue of who should determine whether to certify
a class when the controlling contract is silent on the issue. As Bazzle did not
establish any precedent on this matter, the Court held that the FAA's emphasis on
mutual consent as evidenced by the industrial norm not recognizing class action
arbitration provided the relevant context.4 In doing so, the Court emphasized that
"the basic precept of arbitration is a matter of consent, not coercion."55
IV. INSTANT DECISION
In reviewing the award, the Court chose to avoid the issue of whether the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard of review is statutorily derived or wheth-
er it is a judicial construction.56  Rather, it just assumed "arguendo that such a
standard applies."57 Building off this assumption, the Court borrowed from labor
case law in holding that a judge may vacate an award "when [an] arbitrator strays
from interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively dispense[s]
his own brand of industrial justice."58 This holding marked the first time a court
had used such language in the context of a dispute governed by the FAA.
The Court ruled that the arbitral panel "dispense[d] [its] own brand of indus-
trial justice" by deciding the dispute in accordance with policy considerations
rather than relying on established law.W In making this assertion, the Court ar-
gued that the panel based its decision on only one of three arguments advanced by
AnimalFeeds, namely that "the clause should be construed to permit class arbitra-
tion as a matter of public policy." 6i Furthermore, the majority wrote that the
panel justified its policy-based reasoning by referencing post-Bazzle norms favor-
ing class arbitration, which the parties could not have contemplated since they
contracted prior to the Bazzle decision.62 Additionally, the majority asserted that
the panel completely ignored relevant maritime law, which provided necessary
context for the dispute.63 As such, the Court held that the panel exceeded its pow-
er by ruling according to policy-based considerations in manifest disregard of
existing law, thus dispensing its own brand of industrial justice.6
In rendering its decision, the Court criticized the allegedly policy-based rea-
soning of the Second Circuit that agreeing to arbitrate implies consent to engage
51. Id. at 1766.
52. Id. at 1769.
53, Id. at 1772.
54. Stolt-Nielsen, 120 S. Ct. at 1775.
55. Id. at 1773 (intemal quotations omitted).
56. Id at 1766.
57. Id. at 1768 n.3.
58. Id. at 1767 (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted).
59. Philip J. Loree, Jr., Stolt-Nielsen Delivers a New FAA Rule-and then Federalizes the Law of
Contracts, 28 ALTERNATIVES TO HIGH COST LITIG. 121, 125 (2010).
60. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. 1767-70.
61. Id. at 1768 (internal emphases omitted).
62. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1772 n.8.
63. Id. at 1768.
64. Id at 1767.
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in class-action arbitration.6 5 Although legitimate public policy arguments in favor
of imposing class certification may exist in certain circumstances, the Court found
that the FAA's emphasis on mutual consent overrides any such concerns.6 6
After invalidating the arbitral panel's award and reversing the Second Circuit
holding that the panel had dispensed it own brand of justice, the Court considered
it unnecessary to remand the case to the arbitrators because there was only one
correct holding; imposing class arbitration was unwarranted because the contract
was silent on the issue.
V. COMMENT
The Court in Stolt-Nielsen held that an arbitral panel is prohibited from grant-
ing class certification when the governing contract is silent on the issue, even
when the parties have provided the panel with the authority to decide the matter.6 8
It also provided firm ground for upholding the "manifest disregard of the law"
standard in articulating an expansive standard of review previously only used in
labor law disputes.69 In invoking an overly broad standard of review never before
used in the context of a dispute governed by the FAA, the Court's decision un-
dermines the legitimacy and finality of arbitration proceedings. Furthermore, the
Court's decision to restrict the authority of arbitral panels to decide mere proce-
dural issues may make it more burdensome for aggrieved parties to bring claims
resulting from a transaction governed by a contract containing an arbitration
clause that omits reference to class arbitration.7 0 Although Stolt-Nielsen involved
commercial entities, the courts might extend some of the decision's reasoning to
consumer disputes, which would severely disadvantage plaintiffs.7' Such con-
cerns call for Congressional legislation to prevent further injustice.
A. The Decision Diminishes Arbitral Authority and Legitimacy
The Ginsburg dissent in Stolt-Nielsen provides a persuasive critique of the
majority opinion and a good starting point for analyzing the defects and conse-
quences of the holding. After asserting that the award was not yet ripe for judicial
review, Ginsburg argued that even if it were ripe, the Court should have held that
the "parties' supplemental agreement referring the class-arbitration issue to an
arbitration panel undoubtedly empowered the arbitrators to render their ... deci-
sion."72 As the law clearly establishes that an arbitral panel has the power to de-
cide procedural issues the parties involved in the dispute have explicitly allocated
it authority to resolve, the Court should have simply deferred to the arbitral pan-
65. Id. at 1777.
66. Id. at 1775.
67. Id. at 1770.
68. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1779-80 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
69. Lorce, supra note 59, at 129.
70. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1783 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
71. David Lazarus, Our Right to File Class Actions is in Jeopardy, L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 5, 2010, at Bl.
72. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1780.
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el's decision.73 Ginsburg argued that this granting of authority so conclusively
settled the matter that this "scarcely debatable point should resolve this case."74
Additionally, though the Court did not settle the issue of whether the "manif-
est disregard of the law" standard is derived from section 10 of the FAA or is a
judicially created construction, it nevertheless made the assumption that the stan-
dard still applies.75 In articulating the exact standard used to review the case, the
Court borrowed from the Steelworkers trilogy line of labor arbitration cases in
declaring that a court may overturn an award "when [an] arbitrator strays from
interpretation and application of the agreement and effectively dispense[s] his own
brand of industrial justice."76  Although the Court never explicitly affirmed the
"manifest disregard of the law" standard, the excessively broad standard that it
employed seems to encompass "manifest disregard of the law."77
More than merely adversely affecting the interests of the plaintiffs in Stolt-
Nielsen, this expansive standard for reviewing arbitral awards seems to undermine
arbitration proceedings as a whole. In declaring that a court may review an award
when an arbitrator "dispense[s] his own brand of industrial justice," the Court
dealt a major blow to the finality of arbitral awards. Although this standard may
not seem imprudently broad on its face, when employed in a manner consistent
with the way in which it was applied in Stolt-Nielsen, such a standard significantly
diminishes the finality of arbitral awards.
Prohibiting an arbitral panel from invoking public policy when deciding a
merely procedural matter undermines its authority when the parties involved im-
plicitly understand that the panel might use its broad mandate to justify the award
on such grounds.78 Limiting discretion in this manner inappropriately encroaches
on the province of the arbitral panel, which in turn diminishes the authority and
legitimacy of arbitration proceedings by undermining the finality of the decision.
Allowing for such broad-based review could make arbitration more of "a prelude
to a more cumbersome and time-consuming judicial review process." 79 Although
the full intentions of the drafters of the FAA remain largely unclear, it is certain
that a primary purpose of passing the legislation was to avoid such a situation by
promoting the finality of arbitral awards.80 Thus, the standard of review articu-
lated by the Court in Stolt-Nielsen not only undermines the authority and legitima-
73. Albert G. Bcssor, The Arbitrator Blew It! Now What?, 29 VT. B.J. 39, 45 (2003).
74. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768 n.3.
75. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1768.
76. Id. at 1767 (citing Major League Baseball Players' Ass'n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2001)
(per curiam) (quoting Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960)).
77. Lorec, supra note 59, at 129.
78. Perini Corp. v. Greate Bay Hotel & Casino, Inc., 610 A.2d 364, 385 (N.J. 1992) (Wilcntz., C.J.,
concurring).
People generally choose arbitration for many reasons: speed, economy, and finality. They trust
the process and they trust the arbitrators. Whatever the combination of reasons, the bottom-line
is the same: they choose arbitration because they do not want litigation. They simply do not want
the courts to have anything to do with it. When parties choose arbitration, the role that the judi-
ciary should aim at is to have no role at all.
Id.
79. Hall St. Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 1396, 1405 (2008) (quoting Kyocera Corp. v. Pruden-
tial-Bache Trade Scrvs., Inc., 341 F.3d 987, 998 (9th Cir. 2009)).
80. Bradley T. King, "Through Fault of Their Own "-Applying Bonner Mall's Extraordinary Cir-
cumstances Test to Heightened Standard of Review Clauses, 45 B.C L. REV. 943, 955-56 (2004).
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cy of arbitral proceedings but also the expressed reasoning behind the enactment
the FAA, 8' the provisions of which the Court claims were dispositive in deciding
the case.
Furthermore, parties voluntarily engage in arbitration at the risk that the arbi-
trator will decide the case differently than a court of law.82 Thus, allowing courts
to review an award merely because a judge believes that the panel dispensed its
own industrial brand of justice ignores this implicit understanding of the parties
involved in the dispute. Rather than wasting additional time and resources, courts
should respect the decisions of arbitral panels that are within their authority to
decide. Doing otherwise improperly interferes with the intent of the parties in-
volved, which the Court, again, claimed was the overriding factor in deciding the
case.83
In summary, subjecting awards to judicial review under the 'dispensing jus-
tice' standard of review seems to undermine the legitimacy of arbitration as a
forum for adjudicating disputes. Although Stolt-Nielsen has not yet completely
opened the floodgates of judicial review, the new standard will almost certainly
increase review of arbitral awards.M In light of this, rather than serving as the final
decision of a competent adjudicative entity, the new standard threatens to effec-
tively make arbitral panels minor league institutions that feed disputes to major
league courts of law. More than just disturbing the work of highly qualified arbi-
trators, the holding could further burden already congested courts.
Increased reliance on courts to resolve disputes, whether through judicial
oversight of arbitral awards or by parties choosing to abandon arbitration as a
result of the potential additional hassle of this supervision, will logically serve to
increase transaction costs resulting from added expenses incurred during litiga-
tion. As such, the Court's holding Stolt-Nielsen may have the effect of diminish-
ing the authority and legitimacy of arbitral panels, which would in turn harm the
interests of market participants.
B. Public Policy Considerations: Weighing the Burdens on the Parties
In her dissent, Ginsburg further elaborated on her contention that the Court
should have upheld the award by emphasizing that the plaintiffs, not the defen-
dants, will endure an undue burden if they are not allowed to proceed as a class in
arbitration." The majority based its assertion on the claim that bilateral arbitra-
tion differs from class action arbitration to such an extent that it would be unfair to
impose such proceedings absent explicit consent. Ginsburg persuasively refuted
this contention by pointing out that granting class certification merely stipulates
with whom one must arbitrate claims if the parties involved have expressly agreed
8 1. Id.
82. Perini, 610 A.2d at 385; see also supra note 78 (detailing reasoning).
83. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774.
84. Loree, supra note 59, at 129.
85. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1783 (citing Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 617
(1997); Carnegic v. Household Int'l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) ("Thc realistic alternative
to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic or a fanat-
ic sues for $30.").
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to arbitrate. Moreover, the dissent argued that if a court of law may order class
certification in the absence of expressed contractual consent, an arbitral panel
should also have such authority.87
Rather than overruling the arbitral award on the grounds that the arbitrators
considered policy-based arguments in determining a mere procedural matter, the
Court should have deferred to the panel's well-grounded determination that grant-
ing class certification served the interests of justice in this particular case. Al-
though perhaps not sufficiently articulated by the Court, the power dynamics like-
ly at play during the contractual negotiations underlying the dispute provide fur-
ther justification for the arbitral panel's decision to invoke public policy consider-
ations. In circumstances where a corporation is able to collude with other similar-
ly situated corporations in drafting industry-wide contracts that shift risks and
burdens to the corporations with which they contract, which appears to be the case
in Stolt-Nielsen,88 the balance of power in the bargaining process advantages the
corporations that engage in collusive behavior to such an extent that one could
argue that the weaker party never truly consented to all contractual provisions. If
a corporation exploits this superior bargaining position in the negotiation process
by drafting a contract that precludes class-action arbitration, a plaintiff would
likely find it infeasible to bring a claim against the corporation that does not justi-
fy the legal expenditures required to arbitrate a dispute.89 As such, the holding
allows many corporations to effectively shield themselves from liability by virtue
of their superior bargaining position, which may be the result of improper manipu-
lation of the dynamics of the negotiation process.90 Thus, prohibiting class action
certification as a matter of law when the governing contract is silent on the issue
would more likely unfairly burden the party attempting to bring the claim. Rather
than prohibiting arbitral panels from entertaining public policy considerations
when determining merely procedural matters, the Court should have instead al-
lowed them to decide such issues on a case-by-case basis.
Contrary to the public policy considerations advanced by the majority in rul-
ing that granting class action certification in Stolt-Nielsen would unfairly burden
corporate defendants, prohibiting class certification in such a situation would un-
justifiably disadvantage plaintiffs. As such, the Court should have deferred to the
decision of the arbitral panel in Stolt-Nielsen, thus providing arbitral boards with
the authority to consider broader equitable concerns when determining procedural
issues.
C. Stolt-Nielsen in the Consumer Context
Although the immediate decision involved business entities, the case may
have profound implications for consumers.9' If a case involving class certification
in a consumer dispute were to arise, courts might apply the holding in Stolt-
Nielsen that arbitral panels may not grant class certification when the underlying
86. Id.
87. Id.
88. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764.
89, See supra note 85.
90. Stokl-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1764, 1783.
91. Lazarus, supra note 71 at B1.
[Vol. 2011206
10
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2011, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2011/iss1/11
Dispensing Injustice
arbitration clause is silent on the matter. Considering the lack of any meaningful
bargaining process in consumer contracts, applying this aspect of the holding in
the consumer context would be manifestly unjust.
Even more of a pressing concern is that the decision indicates the Court's
willingness to affirm arbitration clauses in adhesive consumer contracts that ex-
pressly prohibit class action arbitration. Courts in many states routinely refuse to
recognize such provisions on the grounds that they are unconscionable. 92 Howev-
er, the Court may hold that the FAA, ironically the provisions of the statute that
require mutual assent, may override state laws that protect consumers from class
action arbitration waivers imposed on them without their knowledge.93 If the
Court upholds the validity of such provisions, a corporation could effectively
shield itself from liability in consumer contracts by merely altering the language
of an arbitration clause in an adhesion contract, which plainly contradicts the orig-
inal intent of the FAA.9 Far from a hypothetical exercise in the potential reaches
of Supreme Court jurisprudence, the Court is scheduled to decide this very issue
during the 2010 term in AT&T Mobility vs. Concepcion.95 If Stolt-Nielsen is any
guide, the Court will likely hold that the FAA overrides state law protections
against these unconscionable contractual provisions. In light of this, Congress
should enact legislation to prevent further injustice.
One potential piece of legislation that could accomplish this goal is the Arbi-
tration Fairness Act (AFA).96 The AFA would reinstate the FAA's original intent
by requiring that agreements to arbitrate employment, consumer, franchise, or
civil rights disputes be made after the dispute has arisen.97 If passed, the bill
would not only prohibit corporations from effectively shielding themselves from
liability for consumer claims but would also eliminate adhesion contracts in gen-
eral.98 As such, enacting the bill would prevent further injustice resulting from the
Court's misguided hostility towards class action arbitration,
VII. CONCLUSION
In addition to harming the future of arbitration as a viable forum for resolving
disputes, the implications of the Court's reasoning in Stolt-Nielsen threaten the
interests of all consumers who engage in transactions with corporations subject to
jurisdiction in the United States. In establishing such precedent, the Court in-
voked an expansive standard for vacating arbitral awards that undermines the
92. Shelley McGill, Consumer Arbitration Clause Enforcement: A Balanced Legislative Response,
47 AM. Bus. L.J. 361, 380-83 (2010).
93. Lazarus, supra note 71.
94. Kathleen M. McKenna, Litigation Strategy: Arbitration, Mediation & Settlement, 833 PLI/LIT
733, 750 (2010).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 751.
97. H.R. 1020, 11Ith Cong. (2009), 2009 CONG US HR 1020 (Westlaw 2009). Though this bill
was never passed and its sponsor, Senator Russ Feingold voted out of office, in April of 2011 Senators
Franken, Blumenthal and Rep. Hank Johnson announced their intention to file an Arbitration Fairness
Act. Press Release, Senator Franken, Sens. Franken, Blumenthal and Rep. Hank Johnson Announce
Legislation Giving Consumers More Power in the Courts Against Corporations (April 27, 2011) avail-
able at http://frankcn.senate.gov/?p=press rclease&id=1466.
98. McKenna, supra note 94, at 751.
No. I] 207
11
Goodrich: Goodrich: Dispensing Injustice
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2011
208 JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION [Vol. 2011
authority and legitimacy of arbitral panels. More than just disturbing the work of
competent arbitrators, the holding threatens to flood already swamped courts with
a deluge of additional cases. The spill-over resulting from this rising tide of litiga-
tion will increase transaction costs associated with operating in the contemporary
marketplace.
Despite emphasizing that arbitration is based on the principle of "consent not
coercion," the Court may soon extend the holding in Stolt-Nielsen to consumer
contracts, which would allow corporations to impose class action waivers on con-
sumers who do not manifest even a semblance of genuine assent. This would
clearly contradict the original intent of the FAA, the provisions of which the Court
ironically found dispositive in deciding the case. As such, it is imperative that




Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2011, Iss. 1 [2011], Art. 11
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2011/iss1/11
